Abstract: The paper deals with the problem of Peirce's theory of signs, placing it within the context of modern semiotics (comparing it with Saussurean semiology, in particular), and considers Peirce's semiotics from the point of view of his theory of categories (phaneroscopy) and in the terms of his classification of signs. The article emphasizes the complicated system of Peirce's late, "mature", semeiotic and his theory (classification) of Interpretant.
theory of categories (phaneroscopy) and emphasize selected themes from his sign taxonomy. Firstly, we have to say that we can interpret Peirce's semiotics from different angles. For Peirce "semiotics" is basically another name for logic (CP 2.227) 3 -and this could be end of our story, but the way Peirce reinterpreted logic (CP 3. 340) has provided his interpreters with a lifelong struggle/study. Logic includes the way of thinking we can nowadays call formal logic (or syntactics), but also semantics and pragmatics, and the way signs are treated in modes, which is known as speculative grammar. It does not end there: from a Peircean viewpoint, logic corresponds to the theory of the teleological growth of symbols (known as the ethics of terminology 4 ) and finally Peirce's (more or less original) concept of ethics and rhetoric. The struggle is portentous and frightening and this article is definitely not trying to win the battle (to fully describe these themes). We will simply sketch out some basic problems and attempt to trace the path leading to the ontological foundations of Peirce's semiotics. The main thesis of the article is that, without these ontological foundations, we cannot understand Peirce's theory of signs (at the very least in terms of depth and width). Peirce examines ontology using the instruments of logic, but this is a logic as conceived of earlier: in other words, logic is considered to be semiotics (we will see that a sign is also a particular type of relational being). It is important to state (especially if we bear in mind Peirce's theory of categories) that we cannot "cancel out" these questions concerning the ontological foundations simply by using some kind of logical formalism, or (in the worst case) by reducing Peirce's semiotics to a diagram of a "semiotic triangle".
Firstly, we will consider Peirce's semiotics in relation to other types of theories on sign production and action, then we shall demonstrate some of the constitutive principles of Peirce's phaneroscopy and taxonomy of signs, and then we will discuss some of the reasons why Peirce's theory of interpretant is problematic.
It is important to state that during his life Peirce systematically dealt with many philosophical problems, but his philosophy (and semiotics) never became a "romantic complete system". 5 remained the queen of all sciences (CP 1.240), and for some interpreters, in the Czech milieu e. g. Michal Karľa, it is the key to understanding Peirce's semiotics c. f. (Short, x-xi) : Some of Peirce's anticipations of later philosophers-Reichenbach's frequency concept of probability, Popper's idea of theories as conjectures and his propensity concept of probability-are well known, but others, which are equally important, are not. The 'holistic' account of meaning presupposed in the concerns over scientific objectivity raised by Feyerabend and Kuhn had been anticipated by Peirce, as had the view sometimes deployed in opposition to holism, namely, the causal account associated with Kripke and Putnam, among others, of some kinds of reference. Peirce's pragmatism combined these seemingly disparate views, with a third element, the potentiality for future growth as essential to present meaning. That is clearer in his semeiotic writing than in his canonically 'pragmatic' work, and it negates the standard objections that have been made in relation to his pragmatism. It also shows how scientific inquiry is objective despite observation being 'theory-laden'. 3 I use standard abbreviations for Peirce's texts, such as CP for Collected Papers, first number for volume, second for paragraphs. 4 Which (according to John Deely) binds Peirce's interpreters to study scholasticism (see CP 1.91, 2.220, 4.9). 5 It is almost impossible to provide a complete picture of Peirce's work (since Peirce had wide-ranging interests)-his articles and monographs are often focused on particular themes, e. g. semiotics and its
Peirce in modern semiotics
Just as Western philosophy indulges itself in searching for different types of origins, it also takes pleasure in tearing up these "illusionary foundations". There are many presumed and abandoned origins in the history of semiotics: some see the beginning in classical antiquity in Hippocratic τεχνη σηµιωτικὴ, others in the work of Augustin or in the later wide medieval debate on signification in the context of logic and speculative grammar (we have described these elsewhere, c.f. Švantner, 2014a) . In this article we will follow (at least at the beginning) two lines of thought which are linked to modern semiotics. Peirce's philosophical onto/logical theory of the sign and Ferdinand de Saussure's general linguistics conception. On one hand, we have the linguist Junggrammatiker Saussure and his purely deductive and rationalistic model of semiology, who developed his sign theory in a rather Cartesian fashion with poor knowledge of Anglo-Saxon philosophy (namely Locke's theory of the sign)-a sign theory created primarily for examining human languages. On the other hand, we have Peirce, a trained chemist, mathematician, reader of I. Kant and scholastic logic, and his semiotics (or "semeiotic"; c. f. Bergman, 2009, p. 166; Švantner, 2014b) , designed primarily for Peirce's logic and ontology. Saussurean semiology had a strong influence on the history of linguistics (where it has been developed by the Copenhagen school in particular) and also on French structuralist philosophy. Peirce's semiotics first had an impact on discussions in early analytical philosophy and later his theory became a broad matrix of most semiotic theories and applications.
6 So there is division at the threshold of modern semiotics, two untranslatable paradigms (we have described the different perspectives elsewhere; see Švantner, 2014b; c. f. Short, 2007; Palek, 1997) . Here, we will follow the Peircean paradigm, and look at its perspectives and assumptions.
Sign as a relational being
It is obvious that there is an important difference (maybe The Differend) between semiology and semiotics, at least in their beginnings. The difference lies in the different degrees of generality and the scope of the theories discussed. While Saussure studied language as a non-arbitrary system of signs and as particular kind of human action which is restricted by the community of language users, Peirce went farther. His semiotic theory aims to be truly general in impact and describe all kinds of sign production, e. g. onomatopoeias, Hookway, see also Miniha, 2012) etc. It is also evident that in Peircean studies much depends on the author's choice of Peirce's (con)texts or their parts (whether that is Collected Papers or Chronological edition or unpublished manuscripts). Accessing Peirce's "opera aperta" must then involve necessary "editorial work." 6 E. g. problems in general semiotics (the Tartu school, R. Jakobson & U. Eco), or applications in different fields, e. g. in biology (T. A. Sebeok and biosemiotics, or M. Barbieri and his biosemiotical theory of codes, in the Czech context there is also the work of A. Markoš), cognitive sciences and IT, theory of law (R. Kevelson) etc. It must be said that at least in the Czech intellectual environment, Peirce's semiotics is often adapted e. g. to the needs of theatre studies (Osolsobě, 2002; c. f. Smith, 1972, pp. 21-29 ; for a very misleading interpretation see e. g. Černý & Holeš, 2004, pp. 26-27). nonverbal signs, incomplete and visual signs etc. The Peircean path of semiotics then (re)introduces the interpretation that can be found in medieval or baroque scholasticism, for instance. The main idea is that the ability to create and perceive signs, in other words, to code and decode signs, is not only necessary for humankind, but is an ability immanent to any kind of living organism. Moreover, according to some of Peirce's interpreters, this ability is immanent to the whole universe. 7 Peirce did not generally intend to solve the issue of animal languages (and mode of communication, such as latratus canis; c. f. Eco (2012, pp. 173-218) ), but other followers (such as T. A. Sebeok) opted to take this path. The main source for these ideas comes from the departure point of his semiotics-"the mind", which he often discusses, but which is not a "human" concept (as a kind of anthropological constant), but a formal concept (mostly used as an arena for Peirce's criticism of nominalism). To put it another way-Peirce's mind is an abstract semiotic machine and "It is hard for man to understand this, because he persists in identifying himself with his will, his power over the animal organism, with brute force. Now the organism is only an instrument of thought" (CP 5. 315), (hu)man is a sign (EP 1:54, CP 5.314). There is another old idea in Peirce's semiotics (in Collegium Conimbricenses): unlike Saussure and other rationalistic theorists who created a semiological analogy with early modern deductive mathesis universalis (see e. g. Hjemslev, 1971 ), Peirce saw the sign not simply as a mental object. The sign is a fusion between an act of mind and mind-independent being (a fusion between ens rationis and ens reale). In other words, some types of signs are necessarily bounded with "reality" (and we have omitted the difficult question of what reality strictly means in the Peircean corpus). We can illustrate this idea using a caricature: if there are no signs that are generated by their real object, then science does not work-and science evidently works (at least instrumentally). Thus, the signs we use refer to any mind-independent world. This is in the sense that signs (1) share some qualities with their objects (iconic signs), or (2) that there is some kind of causality (indexical signs), or signs (3) are arguments, law, customs or linguistic expressions (then we refer to symbols).
Sign as a triadic relation and semiotics as analysis of this relation
A sign is a relation between an object which presupposes a sign. The sign determines the idea in the interpreter's mind. Peirce calls this determination interpretant. As a result, the sign is a medium which mediates the relation between object and mind (as we described above). 8 The important thing is that in contrast to Latin (and all "stationary" semiotics), Peirce came up with a "genetic" conception of the sign. The starting point of the triadic sign is not sufficiently abstract-we have to base the analysis of the genesis and (triadic) functioning of signs (in other words their semiosis) on two dimensions (of έπιστήµη, c. f. CP 1.279). Firstly in the most abstract philosophy of categories, which describes the mind, when it is connected via any kind of semiosis (thus when the mind faces resistance to an object/sign and produces the interpretans). This is a theory that observes universal (categorical) elements in any sign-content of the mind. Peirce referred to this theory firstly as phenomenology and then phaneroscopy-the doctrine of categories. The second dimension is a taxonomy derived from phaneroscopy, which is the comprehensive classification of all possible relations between objects, signs and intepretants. We will expand on these concepts below.
The sign of three: Phaneroscopy as a prolegomena to any future semiotics that will be able to present itself as a science
The title of the article is perhaps a little clearer now: semiotics is Peirce's vertiginous struggle to describe the action and function of objects as a signs, widely known as semiosis. Peirce's semiotics is located between a strong metaphysical imagination and pursuit of the most accurate scientific formulation. This is illustrated in the following words by Peirce's biographer: Peirce "believed that Aristotelian and medieval realism provided the basis for a reconstruction of the nature of knowledge, not only consistent with, but embodied in the practice of science itself. Pierce fervently believed that he had discovered a model of thinking which exemplified this belief and which was, at the same time, the key to understanding the way the universe is made" (Brent, 1998, p. 4) . The architectonics of the universe contains three categories: first, second and third. Sometimes Peirce is (mis)interpreted as being the inventor of an anti-metaphysical philosophy (see e. g. Morris, 2001 , p. 145)-as we shall see, these interpretations are simply incorrect. Peirce's semiotics developed over the years and we will focus here on what is known as mature semiotics (Short, 2007, p. 27) , which can be dated back to between approximately 1902 and 1904, when Peirce introduced the idea of phaneroscopy:
the Doctrine of Categories, whose business it is to unravel the tangled skein of all that in any sense appears and wind it into distinct forms; or in other words, to make the ultimate analysis of all experiences the first task to which philosophy has to apply itself (CP 1.280).
As we have said, the aim of this method is to observe basic and universal ("cenopythagorean") categories in phenomena/phaneron, which "unlock […] many secrets" (CP 1.352; 8.328) and are:
of objects with ideas. The correct formula is, then, rather, aliquid stat pro alio, "something that stands for another than itself, something that may or may not present itself objectively yet always presents objectively something that it itself is not". Since the reality of relation and hence of general modes of being was his starting point, Peirce was able to begin more or less at the most advanced point reached in the earlier Latin conversation" (Deely, 2000, pp. 39-40; c. f. CP 5.264-317, W 2:213; Eco 2011, p. 37 ).
1. Firstness -something "is" 9 2. Secondness -what "is", is in action (in struggle), in a relation and therefore our experience is possible. 3. Thirdness, what "is" can be communicated.
We can interpret these categories as possibility, action and communication (articulation). Evidently I can communicate ("third"), but I can only communicate if there is a performing act, a relation ("second"). This act, this relation, then presupposes the "first" so that it can be realized-consequently communication requires the possibility that there is a reality, some qualities, which can be realized. According to Peirce if there are no qualities, there are no relations, and there is no argumentation.
10 As Brent said, this triad penetrates the whole universe and the practice of science. In other words-what we can think and articulate and what can be investigated cannot be considered "outside" this categorization. We can observe these categories (CP 2. 227) which pervade all that we know as reality and apply them-to our method of reasoning and to the categories themselves. Peirce himself (at least in his sign taxonomy) was one the strongest proponents of this application. His maxim was that we have to avoid any method that are not applicable to method itself. In Peirce's view this was the mistake in Cartesianism (c. f. CP 2.370). Peirce's view contradicts Descartes'-certainty is not given in ego, but has to be modalized-individually by the researcher, and more importantly for Peirce, globally by a community of researchers.
11

Semiotic trivium
These categories are truly trivial and are just the beginning of the semiotician's adventures. According to phaneroscopy, we can postulate a trivium of semiotic sciences, which allows us to move and breathe in this space. The basic element in semiotics is the investigation of the formal conditions of signs-investigating all events which bear the burden of meaning. The first part of semiotics explores the sign as a possibility and realizations of this possibility. Peirce call this grammatica speculativa (as Thomas of Erfurt did), or pure or formal grammar. From a different perspective this approach is a type of analytical metaphysics, or a metaphysical exploration of types of modalities. The second part of semiotics is formal logic, which considers the formal conditions of signs related to truth, while the third integral part of semiotics is formal rhetoric (or methodeutic), which explores the "power" of signs, their effects and growth. If we conclude within the framework of the phaneroscopical triad: semiotics should explore the sign and its ground (foundation of 9 Why is "is" in quotation marks? According to Peirce if we "add" any kind of predicate to firstness we have reached secondness. My interpretation contradicts that of Claudio Paolucci and U. Eco (2012, p. 524) , who describe firstness as being singular and variable-if we attribute these predicates to firstness, we "lose" it. Moreover Paoluci's interpretation is based on some disparate notes from CP 6.54 (c. f. Peirce relations), relation to object, and whether this relation is truthful or not (if our observation is correct-we avoid here Peirce's subtle theory of truth and truthful reasoning), and finally the relation between sign and interpretant (the idea that is determined in the mind of the interpreter)-in other words investigating how an idea gives (or does not give) birth to another (in other words there is a question of codes: e. g. why is something mis-placed in language or science?). Then semiotic research is undivided: analogously to components of the sign (c. f. CP 8.342). Peirce's belief that he had found the key to understanding universe in its triadicity is palpable here (c. f. Christopherson & Johnstone, 1981) . With these (phaneroscopical) presuppositions Peirce's definitions of the sign and semiosis seems clearer e. g. (CP 2.303):
Genuine mediation is the character of a Sign. A Sign is anything which is related to a Second thing, its Object, in respect to a Quality, in such a way as to bring a Third thing, its Interpretant, into relation to the same Object, and that in such a way as to bring a Fourth into relation to that Object in the same form, ad infinitum.
As we have shown elsewhere (Švantner, 2014b ), Peirce conducted a subtle analysis of the possibilities of this relation, when he demonstrated that an object has two modes-the immediate (the object as the sign represents it) and dynamical (an extremely efficient but not immediately present object).
12 Per analogiam Peirce is inferring that there is an immediate interpretant (represented or signified in the sign) and dynamical interpretant (effect actually produced in the mind of the interpret by the sign. The third is normal (or logical or final), which is the "effect that would be produced on the mind by the Sign after sufficient development of thought" (CP 8. 343, emphasis MŠ). We will focus on Peirce's theory of interpretants here.
Interpretant in the light of phaneroscopy
We can observe that there are some objects, in action which determine ideas thus-as an immediate, dynamical or normal intepretant. An immediate object is analogically a kind of firstness to a dynamical object. It is a quality of impression that the sign can produce (CP 8.315) ; in other words, any interpretation has this possibility (interpretability) (c. f. Palek, 12 C. f. CP 8.343 and CP 8.183): "As to the Object, that may mean the Object as cognized in the Sign and therefore an Idea, or it may be the Object as it is regardless of any particular aspect of it, the Object in such relations as unlimited and final study would show it to be. The former I call the Immediate Object, the latter the Dynamical Object. For the latter is the Object that Dynamical Science (or what at this day would be called 'Objective' science) can investigate. Take for example, the sentence 'the Sun is blue.' Its Objects are 'the Sun' and 'blueness.' If by 'blueness' be meant the Immediate Object, which is the quality of the sensation, it can only be known by Feeling. But if it means that 'Real,' existential condition, which causes the emitted light to have short mean wave-length, Langley has already proved that the proposition is true. So the 'Sun' may mean the occasion of sundry sensations, and so is Immediate Object, or it may mean our usual interpretation of such sensations in terms of place, of mass, etc., when it is the Dynamical Object. It is true of both Immediate and Dynamical Object that acquaintance cannot be given by a Picture or a Description, nor by any other sign which has the Sun for its Object. If a person points to it and says, See there! That is what we call the 'Sun,' the Sun is not the Object of that sign. It is the Sign of the sun, the word 'sun' that his declaration is about; and that word we must become acquainted with by collateral experience" (c. f. CP 8.343, 5.423; EP 2:492). 1997, p. 21). The second type is a dynamical interpretant, which is the actual effect that it has upon the interpreter and is connected with secondness. It presupposes direct contact with the object (there is some kind of dynamical action besides the possibility of an immediate interpretant). The third, normal interpretant is the most puzzling type-as Peirce claimed, we need "sufficient development of thought", what might that be? In our opinion, it could simply be the result of any investigation ("This is the murderer!") or research (e. g. a solved equation). We can see that our interpretation scheme is plausible here-the third is a kind of communication, or articulation. (In everyday, perhaps "normal", language we often say: I can articulate this problem; c. f. Peirce's notes in Letter to Lady Welby (CP 4.536, 5.475-479).
More interpretants
There are another three kinds of interpretant, which Peirce postulates, and they seem to open up a line of inquiry different to that that found in, for example, a Letter to Lady Welby. These signs/interpretants are emotional, energetic and logical. This paradigmatic "shift" can be understood as John J. Fitzgerald (1966) understood it, for instance, when he conceived of a triad of interpretants as a kind of dynamic interpretant. We will show that this idea is at least inaccurate (according to our previous perspective), especially when we incorporate the idea of the final interpretant. Peirce's famous example is about a soldier "marching up and down the square" when his commander yells: Ground arms!" The emotional interpretant is then a feeling caused by the "musical performance" of the commander's voice, the energetical is an event triggered by the command (lay down the rifle) and the logical interpretant is the idea itself (but there is a danger of soldier-semiotician or soldier-philosopher who instead of performing the order reflects it). In the schedule of categories: the emotional interpretant represents quality of emotion, and the energetic interpretant action and logical articulation. What is important here is that the "interpretation" (considered in a general sense as the action of the interpretans) is not always "rational" ("logical"), if it were, we would never get "from idea to action", in other (general) words interpretation is triadic semiosis. If we follow Short (2007) here, the final interpretant is the relation of dynamical interpretant to its dynamical object that determines the "success or failure" of the interpretation or of performing an action (e. g. also the success of the experiment). The correlate of this relation is just the "logically" final (normal) interpretant (the immediate is the source of all possible interpretations of the situation). As the objective of military training is to reduce the time between giving and executing orders, this reduction is analogous to the relation (perhaps the time gap) between the immediate and final interpretant-the point is, that the final interpretant should be the most adequate (c. f. Apel, 1982) .
In this part of The Collected Papers, Peirce interprets the signs in relation to larger sign units, namely sentences or units larger than the sentence (today we might say discourse). In the light of our previous reflections, it seems that this is precisely because he has postulated the final (or normal) interpretant. In this section, we have summarized Peirce's concept of the sign with the emphasis on the interpretant. We have indicated the fundamental principles of the theory of categories and their importance in semiotics. In the last part of the article, we will focus on the promised structure of sign taxonomy which has been developed out of principles outlined earlier.
How exactly can we think about/classify signs?
For Peirce there are two sides to the answer: The first side is the actual classification, the second is found in the (phaneroscopical) structure of the classification. We will describe these two faces of Janus retrospectively-we will examine Peirce's well known classification (from Grammatica speculativa and related writings on sign taxonomy from around 1903) from the perspective of his late semiotics (Letter to Lady Welby, 1908) .
According to Lady Welby
In the context of our previous analysis of the structure of the sign, the answer to the question raised in the title is that the sign is analogically interpretable to "reality" (and its functions in triadicity) in several ways (as was illustrated using the interpretant as an example). In his late period, Peirce attempted to sort ways of classification as follows (CP 8.344 , or as The Ten Main Trichotomies of Signs as they are apprehended by Peirce in 1908 Dec. 24): 1) Depending on how the sign is perceived (mode of apprehension). 2) Depending on whether the sign represents an immediate object-we suggest this be seen as the semantic level of sign production. 3) According to the mode of being of the dynamic object (in other words, the question is how is a dynamical object presented within semiosis). It seems that we can express this as being "isolated"-this is essentially the task of speculative grammar (perhaps we can understand dynamical object as being "ground" here). 4) According to the relation between sign and its dynamical object, the representation of a dynamical object (see earlier comments about the final interpretant). It appears that this is some form of Platonism-we should examine the relationship between quality and representation (e.g. concrete and formal triangle). 5) Depending on whether the sign represents an immediate interpretant. Here logical (syntactical) examination of the "veracity" of symbols. 6) According to the mode of being of the dynamical interpretant. In this class the aim is to examine the general relation between interpretability and the mind of the interpreter. 7) According to the relation between sign and dynamical interpretant. In this case it concerns the rhetorical examination of the effects of signs-what the sign immediately evokes in the mind of the interpreter. 8) According to the nature of a normal (final) interpretant. How can a normal interpretant be represented as an object? 9) According to the relation between the Sign and the normal interpretant. How can the final interpretant be represented as a sign? 10) And finally, the basic and most general and problematic classification of the signs in triadic relation between sign, dynamical object and normal interpretant. In other words, in this class the relationship between relational being as a sign and an objective existence and quality, and time and finality (where the final/normal interpretant is the sufficient development of ideas). This is the basic classification from Peirce's late semiotics, which as we can see is the favored triad of icon, index and symbol (from Peirce's Grammatica speculativa) taking on a much more subtle dimension (c. f. Jakobson, 1974 ). Now we can look deeper into the abyss of Peirce's taxonomy-these classes are kinds of "titles" of other divisions-to understand signs in their ultimate structure we have to apply phaneroscopy to these classes-to interpret these classes from the point of view of firstness, secondness and thirdness and by applying this to the triads we can tell if the triad is valid or not. Peirce thus leaves other researchers 59049 (3 10 ) difficult questions to consider. Certainly do not try to answer them in this article: answering this challenge is very close to the dream of a final theory for everything.
Conclusion
As is obvious, this article did not reach the final interpretant-from Peirce's perspective this goal is primarily designed for a community of scientists-truth for this semiotician is the daughter of time. But his semiotics is still unfinished. This article has tried to sketch out (perhaps fruitfully, perhaps plausibly) a perspective for interpreting Peirce's theory of sign from the perspective of his doctrine of categories, which is a basic kind of "description" (and prescription), which all of Peirce's interpreters have had to struggle with-because if they do not there is a danger that we will end up with a simple and reductive schematism: e. g. naive semiotic triangles, which Peirce never sketched and we have seen that Peirce's schemes are much more challenging than that.
For after all, what is a likely hypothesis? It is one which falls in with our preconceived ideas. But these may be wrong. Their errors are just what the scientific man is out gunning for more particularly. But if a hypothesis can quickly and easily be cleared away so as to go toward leaving the field free for the main struggle, this is an immense advantage. (CP 1.120) 
